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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years theology has experienced a re-
newal in the area of hermeneutics. This renaissance includes 
more than a stimulating interest in the principles of inter-
pretation, a periodic revival similar to those that have 
come and gone in other theological fields. Hermeneutics has 
broken the boundaries in which it has been confined since 
the age of orthodoxy and assumed totally new proportions, 
even to the extent of becoming the focal point of theology 
for some theologians. To trace some of the philosophical in-
fluences behind and in this movement is the proposed task of 
this paper. 
The disciplines of philosophy and theology have often, 
if not always, influenced one another. For whenever philoso-
phy dealt with "ultimates", it was certain to enter the 
territory of theological thinking. And whenever theology 
sought to be a logos about God, it automatically dwelt in 
the domain of philosophy. Sometimes the two have hadclOser 
relations, for example, when philosophy offered and theology 
accepted the prestige of a solid, rationally grounded, stable 
system. One only need mention the Platonic orientation of 
Plotinus, St. Thomas' adaption of Aristotle or the rational-
istic coloring of eighteenth century theology. Contemporary 
theology has likewise discovered a stimulating basis for its 
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germinal thinking in the fertile field of existentialism. 
In particular, the structure and terminology of Martin 
Heidegger's thought has been almost too readily adaptable 
to Biblical themes. His monumental work, Sein un.Zeit (1927), 
with its ontological description of man (Dasein), has been 
explicitly accepted by Rudolf Bultmann as the most accurate 
characterization of man that philosophy has to offer. If 
the expressions of Sein und Zeit (Thrownness, Care, Dread, 
Destiny) are conducive to theology, even more so are the 
almost mystic-like Heideggerian images that have appeared 
since 1935.1 These writings have become increasingly con-
cerned with the function of language as a transmitter of 
Being to man. 
Theologians have been quick to utilize Heidegger's in-
sights in their new hermeneutical quest. Heinrich Ott in 
particular has proclaimed an affinity with the "later" 
Heidegger as he attempts a refounding of theology along the 
lines of hermeneutics. Other theologians, for example, 
Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, have likewise shown a favor-
able disposition toward Heidegger's thinking. However, their 
indebtedness is not as vocal as Ott's. For this reason, I 
propose to explicate Ott's approach and thereby indirectly 
show the influence Heidegger has had on the new hermeneutic 
as a whole. First, it must be noted that Ott's work is still 
in its initiatory stage. Having recently assumed the chair 
of his former professor Karl Barth at the age of 33, he has 
published only two major works: Denken und Sein: Der Weg 
Martin Heidegger und der Weg der Theologie and Dogmatik und 
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Verktindigunq (translated Theology and Preaching). These, 
plus Ott's few recent publications, with heaviest emphasis 
on Denken und Sein, comprise the source data for one major 
portion of the paper. The other block of material extensive-
ly covered is that group of Heidegger's later writings 
dealing specifically with his view of language and communica-
tion. All other materials quoted either helped form the 
introductory chapter or expressed salient criticisms and/or 
conclusions. 
As stated, the paper's main task is one of explication, 
first Heidegger (chapter three) and then Ott (chapter four). 
These two chapters form the nucleus of the work. Chapter 
two offers a brief background survey and definition of the 
"new hermeneutic". Chapter five summarizes and draws the 
conclusion that the development of this "new hermeneutic" 
especially viewed through the thought of Heinrich Ott is 
toward an ontological hermeneutic dependent on and influenced 
by the thinking of the "later" Heidegger. 
Before we proceed, a brief remark about Heidegger's 
terminology needs to be made. Any English rendering of 
Heidegger's thought=translation or commentary--confronts 
this problem. John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans-
lators of Sein und Zeit put it this way. 
As long as an author is using words in their ordinary 
ways, the translator should not have much trouble in 
showing what he is trying to say. But Heidegger is con-
stantly using words in ways which are by no means 
ordinary, and a great part of his merit lies in the 
freshness and penetration which his very innovations 
reflect. He tends to discard much of the traditional 
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philosophical terminology, substituting an elaborate 
vocabulary of his own. He occasionally coins new 
expressions from older roots, and he takes full ad-
vantage of the ease with which the German langu
a
ge 
lends itself to the formation of new compounds. 
Example's of the above mentioned difficulty include such 
terms as existential/ existentiell, Dasein, Historie/ 
Geschichte, Geschick, Sein/Seienden,Geworfenheit, Being-
in-the-worid and Gevierte to name but a few. To facilitate 
the reader's understanding, these terms will be further ex-
plained in footnotes whenever their appearance in the paper 
is not self explanatory. 
CHAPTER II 
THE "NEW HERMENEUTIC" 
The "new hermeneutic"--a phrase constructed by James 
Robinson--has become one of the recent additions to the 
theologian's vocabulary. Robinson and John Cobb, colleagues 
and co-editors, have with the publication of the second 
volume of their series New Frontiers In Theology supplied 
the definition of this new term. Entitling their work The 
New Hermeneutic) the editors have gathered the essays pre-
sented at the first Consultation on Hermeneutic assembled at 
Drew University in the spring of 1962. The book, like the 
Consultation, is to be an exploratory attempt at inter-
continental dialogue, for the main essayists are two German 
theologians: Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs. Robinson has 
taken the emphases of these two men, along with those of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer,2 to be the principal claims of the new 
hermeneutic. Robinson's procedure has been challenged by 
Carl Braaten in his recent article "How New Is The New 
Hermeneutic?"3 The question is well put, for the Fuchs-
Ebeling-Gadamer (and whoever else this may include) her-
meneutic acknowledges a definite historical ancestory. 
Familiarity with these origins is an indispensible prere-
quisite for understanding what is meant by the "new her-
meneutic". 
In its broadest definition, hermeneutic is a process of 
clarifying the unclear. Its etymological source is the Greek 
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word hermEheia, which in turn took shape and content from 
the Greek diety Hermes--herald of the gods. As herald, 
Hermes conveyed messages among the gods as well as trans-
lated divine thoughts and secrets to men. Correspondingly, 
the scope of heregneia included the functions of "speech", 
"translation" and even "commentary". For our purposes 
though, the brief historical survey might begin with Luther, 
who, as Ebeling contends, retained the breadth and com-
prehensiveness of the Greek hermTneia through his Reformation 
byword "sola scriptura".4 In the years following, in the 
wake of the rise of Orthodoxy, "biblical theology" with its 
watchword "verbal inspiration" abandoned its viable her-
meneutical heritage. Instead "biblical theology" equated 
scripture with the Word of God engendering both the split 
between sacred and profane hermeneutics and the separation 
between exegesis and hermeneutics. Form criticism, with its 
inclination toward scientific methodology, even further 
limited the scope of hermeneutics. Relegated to the role of 
a technical tool in the service of exegesis, hermeneutics 
was now restricted to a three-fold task: dealing with the 
text established by textual criticism, delving into the his-
torical background of scriptures and treating pericopes as 
literary forms.5 Hermeneutics was sterile. 
This lethargic confinement was shattered when Karl 
Barth published his Commentary on Romans (1918). Barth's 
thinking was not radically new; its legacy extended all the 
way back to Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Ernst Daniel 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) rejected the conception of her- 
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meneutics commonly accepted in his day, i.e., "an aggregate 
of individual observations of a general and special nature%6  
Instead of concentrating on "explanation" he focused on the 
problem of understanding or on the conditions of the possi-
bility of understanding. Is it possible for understanding 
to bridge the gap between past and present? Schleiermacher 
contended that comprehension of a literary work produced in 
the past includes more than a treatment of external form 
(text, historical setting and literary analysis). Inter-
pretation is the imaginative reproduction of the creative 
act by which the work was originally produced. Man can 
bridge this gap, can establish a rapport with past generations 
because human nature in general with its social life allows 
for a common, universal speech and understanding. 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)7 endorsed the central posi-
tion to which Schleiermacher had elevated understanding 
and sought to objectify it in language. Language is the 
objective expression of man's inner workings. Language, then, 
is the bridge spanning the historical gap between the text 
and the exegete. The exegete through language can cut to the 
heart of the author's message because he too has had experi-
ences similar to the ones linguistically objectified by the 
author. Bultmann presents Dilthey's method as follows: 
"All individual distinctions are ultimately conditioned 
not by qualitative differences of persons from each 
other, but only by differences of degree in what goes 
on in their souls. But while in this the exegete, as 
it were, experimentally transposes his own quality of 
living into an historical milieu, on the basis of this 
he is able momentarily to emphasize and intensify some 
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of the processes of his own soul, and to let the others 
recede into the background, and so to induce in him-
self an imitation of a life which is not native to him." 
The conditioning of understanding "lies in the fact 
that nothing can appear in an unfamiliar, individual 
form of expression which was not also contained in the 
quality of living that comprehends it". And that can 
be interpreted in this way: "Exegesis is a work of 
personal art, and its most consummate execution is con-
ditioned by the mental make-up of the exegete; and so 
it rests on affinity, intensified by a thoroughgoing 
communion with the author--by constant study2' 8  
The endowment which Schleiermacher and Dilthey bequeathed 
to hermeneutics was the extension of its scope. No longer 
bound to exegetical servitude, to the theoretical principles 
governing interpretation of historical documents, hermeneutics 
now proceeded to lay the foundation of anepistemology in the 
"event of language". No wonder Barth's Romans caused such 
reaction. Written when the orthodox view of hermeneutics 
still prevailed, the Preface to the first edition contained 
this statement. 
The critical historical method of Biblical research has 
its validity. It points to the preparations for under-
standing that is never superfluous. But if I had to 
choose between it and the old doctrine of inspiration, 
I would decidedly lay hold of the latter. It has the 
greater, deeper, more important validity, for it points 
to the actual work of understanding, without which all 
preparation is useless. I am happy not to have to choose 
between the two. But my whole attention was directed 
to looking through the historical to the spirit of the 
Bible, which is the eternal spirit.9  
We now turn to Rudolf Bultmann and the contributing part 
he played in hermeneutics' expanding movement. As did 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey before him, Bultmann looked for 
the thing (Sache) in the text which linked author and inter-
preter. He did not find it in an understanding common to 
human nature as had his predecessors. Rather, the point of 
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contact was the meaningful relation that both author and 
interpreter have to the subject (Sache). Bultmann merely 
replaced one presupposition with another. Instead of pre-
supposing a common understanding, Bultmann openly avowed 
that one goes to the text seeking answers to the questions 
of his existence. To this end the writer writes, the inter-
preter interprets, and both writer and interpreter find the 
common thing that answers their particular questions. Pre-
suppositions are not to be scorned, though; in fact, her-
meneutics determines with the greatest degree of accuracy 
precisely with what presuppositions the author/interpreter 
approaches the text.1° The subject content (Sache) becomes 
so important for Bultmann (it is larger than either author 
or interpreter) that language is even incapable of adequately 
transmitting it. Certain forms of language, e.g., mythology, 
are more defective than others, but these flaws only parti-
cularize and intensify language's inherent incompetence. 
At this point, the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic" 
turns aside from the negative treatment language received 
at the hands of Bultmann to the counteracting, positive posi-
tions of Fuchs and Ebeling. These two theologians reinstated 
language's priority, not by disregarding the subject matter 
(Sache), but by revealing the subject matter's dependence 
on language. The language (Sprache) referred to by Fuchs 
and Ebeling is language in its most original form--language 
as action or as event. This language is a happening or a 
showing or a letting be seen.11 Fuchs calls it a language 
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event (Sprachereignis), Ebeling a word event (Wortgeschehen).12 
Though the radical feature of this motion is that the impetus 
originates outside of man, it does not leave man in any way 
passive. Language event carries a demand that man 
cor-'respond'. The reason, says Robinson, is this. 
The subject matter of which language speaks is primarily 
being. It is man's very nature to hearken to the 
call of being. "Man is is actually this relation of 
cor-'respond'-ence, and only this." In this way lan-
guage is located at the center of man's nature, rather 
than being regarded primarily as an objectification of 
an otherwise authentic self-understanding. For man's 
nature is defined as linguistic, in that his role is to 
re-speak, to re-spond, to an-swer the call of being.13  
Language is located at the center of man's nature, and 
language's location is being (Being). The apparent discre-
pency14 is resolved when language is also seen as the gift 
of Being. Once the gift is received, man responds. Only 
in response does language assume the conversational form of 
speech and word to which we are normally accustomed. Even 
this human speech is directly related to Being, for it 
directs the hearer back to the horizons in which he can again 
hear language's original utterance. Stated theologically, 
the description might be as follows. 
It is at this point that the term hermeneutic attains 
the specific profile characteristic of the new hermeneu- 
tic, as "faith's doctrine of language".. "Being emerges 
from language, when language directs us into the dimen- 
sion of our existence determinative for our life. Is 
that the 'meaning' of the word of God? Then hermeneutic 
in theology would indeed be nothing else than the 
'doctrine of the word of God' (Ebeling), faith's doc- 
trine of language. The reverse is also true: The 
theological doctrine of the word of God would be the 
question as to being in the horizon of Biblical language."15  
The movement from Being through language to man and back again 
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has its historic dimensions since the recipient is always 
man. This averts a possible criticism of the language 
event--its transcendent, timeless communion with Being. 
But what happens to the historically conditioned biblical 
texts with which hermeneutics has traditionally dealt? 
How does the language event affect the historic Jesus? 
Robinson answers: 
Perhaps nowhere more clearly then here does one hear 
the sense in which the "saving event" is a "language 
event", since language, when it is true language, is 
God's saving word. And perhaps nowhere more clearly 
than here does one hear the central role of language 
in a new theology that has its foci in the historic 
Jesus and hermeneutic. For the "historic Jesus" is 
heard not as "objective factuality", but as "word of 
address"; and "hermeneutic" is heard not as "under-
standing in a speechless profundity," but as "transla-
tion into language that speaks today". Thus hermeneutic 
is the method suited to the historic Jesus, and the his-
toric Jesus is the material poi pt of departure for a 
recovery of valid hermeneutic.1°  
The historic is taken into account, but the main emphasis still 
resides in language--the originative language event. This 
emphasis of Fuchs and Ebeling, Robinson takes to be the unique 
factor in the new hermeneutic, and for this reason he has re-
introduced the singular "hermeneutic". The "new hermeneutic" 
signals the surpassing of Orthodoxy's confinement and the 
reinstatement of the comprehensiveness included in the 
original Greek hermeneia. Fuchs and Ebeling have chosen the 
theory of understanding and originative language as their 
primary concerns, and these elements, as we shall see in the 
analyses of Heidegger and Ott, have led the new hermeneutic 
to embrace what Michalson and Gadamer call an ontological 
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1.1ermeneutic.17 We now turn to Heidegger to begin our 
analysis 
CHAPTER III 
THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE AND HERMENEUTIC 
IN THE "LATER" HEIDEGGER.  
No matter where one meets Heidegger, he will soon en-
counter the dominating theme with which Heidegger constantly 
grapples--the overcoming of metaphysics. This is the pro-
ject envisioned in the introductory paragraph of Sein and 
Zeit. Metaphysics has deprived the question of Being of any 
content and left it meaningless and superfluous. Plato was 
the culprit who sidetracked the genuine quest of the pre-
Socratics away from Being itself and instead centered the 
search in beings. From Plato onwards the tradition of Western 
metaphysics never found its way back to the authentic in-
quiry. The extensive Grecian view of physis including the 
study of first causes or principles, shrunk to a concern with 
material objects. This standpoint underwent further con-
finement in the development of techyu. Material entities 
became objectified as manipulatable tools. Thoughtbecame 
focused in beings, their description and practical use. 
Even the transcendent was conceived of in terms of being, 
either the summation of all beings (analogia entis) or that 
which being was not (via negitiva). This fruitless method-
ology was carried to its limits in Hegel's equation of the 
rational with the real. One necessary step remained--
Nietzsche's declaration that "God is dead", that a meta- 
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physics restricted to the examination of beings has no 
further contribution to make. 
To escape metaphysic traditional pitfall and to 
initiate a new approach to the Question of Being (i.e., to 
revitalize the freshness of the original, pre-Socratic one), 
Heidegger proposed to erect an ontology via the method of 
phenomenology. Phenomenology is a method employing 
description and finds its meaning in interpretation 
(hermeneutic). Through a process of elimination, Heidegger 
chose Dasein (man) as the only possible being whose descrip-
tion is capable of revealing something about Being.- The 
repercussions of this choice are important because 
the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the 
primordial signification of this word, where it 
designates this business of interpreting. But to the 
extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the 
basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit 
the horizon for any further ontological study of those 
entities which do not have the character of Dasein, 
this hermeneutic also becomes a "hermeneutic" in the 
sense of working out the conditions on which the possi-
bility of any ontological investigation depends.2  
Heidegger sought to discover Dasein's Existentiales-- 
ontology's counterpart to metaphysics' categories. These 
Existentiales--Thrownness, Care, Speech (Rede) and many others-- 
continue to maintain their validity even though Heidegger 
later admitted that his attempt to found an ontology along 
the lines of Sein and Zeit was inadequate; it lapsed back 
into metaphysical thinking; it was merely a step on the way.3  
Even before this overt comment was made such commentators 
as DeWaelhens, Jean Wahl and Karl Lowith claimed that 
Heidegger had abandoned his projected work of destroying 
metaphysics and instead embraced a kind of poetic mysticism.3 
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So as not to be sidetracked by this controversy, we simply 
cite Langan's comment that it is possible to speak of a 
shift in accent in Heidegger's thought.4 There have been 
several possible interpretations of this shift: the devia-
tion toward mysticism mentioned above or the turn from Nichts  
zum Sein as seen by Heinrich Ott.5 No interpretation is 
conclusive. But it is not difficult to isolate one major 
trend--Heidegger's attentiveness to Being and his increasing 
preoccupation with language as the link between Being and 
Dasein. On this latter shift in thought we now concentrate 
our attention. 
The most engaging question which Heidegger raises is 
the relation which man (Dasein) has to Being. If ontic, 
everyday affairs lie closest to man's immediate interests 
while his ontological structures farthest, and if man's ob-
session with the ontic (beings) has incapacitated the meta-
physical or ontological approach, what method or event or 
process is capable of vaulting us over these trivialities 
to the place where an authentic questioning of Being can 
be undertaken? Sein and Zeit pointed to one possible solu-
tion--acceptance of one's death. Much too briefly stated, 
the line of argument went something like this. Da-sein6  
discovers himself "thrown" (Geworfen) into the world. This 
view of the past is also coupled with Understanding 
(Verstehen)--the ability to project into the future--and 
Discourse (Rede)--the ability to make the future and past 
present in words. Future, past and present, and in that 
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order, are the three prongs of Heideggerian temporality. 
These temporal aspects, however, are not of the same 
"value".7 The aspect of futurity stands out from the others 
in that the past and present are finally given their full 
meaning in terms of the future. The importance of the future 
comes about in this way. Dasein is the type of being for 
which Being is an issue for it because Dasein grasps itself 
in its wholeness. To do this it (Dasein) must be able to 
apprehend its limits, particularly its end. Dasein's ending 
limit is death--the one thing it cannot experience. The 
death of the Other can be experienced, but only as a 
Vorhandenheit8 or in an objective way. Experience of my own 
death is impossible because death means the impossibility 
of being any longer. Dasein's relationship to its death 
does not remain meaningless though, for the full existential 
import of death is an experiencing of Sein-zum-Tode (Being-
towards-death). Being-towards-death makes Dasein primarily 
futurally oriented. 
The primacy of this future orientation can be further 
grasped by tracing the steps through which Dasein is made 
aware of his Being-towards-death. Care was discovered through 
anxiety which resulted from the nausl'e experienced in the 
un-authentic modes of being.9 Likewise, Being-towards-death 
is apprehended in the Call of conscience. Conscience's Call 
issues from the silent uncanniness experienced in Dasein's  
awareness of the meaning of death. The Call says nothing; it 
merely brings Dasein face to face with the "Nothing"--that 
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which death points to. Conscience and its Call have a 
positive aspect too. Not only does conscience confront 
Dasein with the Nothing; because it manifests itself as 
the Call of Care, conscience calls Dasein to "Resoluteness"; 
it calls Dasein forth into the Situation. In other words, 
"conscience suggests a note of awareness, the kind of 
awareness that is born of a steady gaze directed at things 
as they are"10 Authentic living is resolute acceptance of 
that which is--the Nothing revealed in death. This acceptance 
is included in the phrase "Being-towards-death". Dasein  
lives authentically when he orients his life as a Being-
towards-death, when he interprets his past and present in 
terms of the future. This makes Dasein an Ek-sistent; he 
stands out of his past thrownness and immersion in the 
present "they" to resolutely accept his possibilities as 
Being-towards-death. 
Sein und Zeit masterfully analyzes contemporary man 
encumbered with mass thinking and mores, yet possessing the 
potential possibility through Care, Conscience and Resolve 
to throw off these shackles. It is mainly these Heideggerian 
insights that have found ready acceptance, e.g., Binswanger 
in psychology or Bultmann in theology, despite Heidegger's 
claim that Sein und Zeit was to be much more than an 
anthropological description, that it was primarily an explora-
tory probe into the questioning of Being. Being-towards-death 
relates man to himself, but how is he related to Being? As 
Heidegger approached this question in the years after 
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Sein and Zeit, his stress on "Nothingness" was the first 
indication of a shift in accent. What Is Metaphysics (1929) 
and a later introduction to this essay, The Way Back Into 
The Ground Of Metaphysics,11 poses THE question, "Why is 
there any being at all and not rather Nothing? u12 A 
biased regard for beings occasioned metaphysics' downfall; 
man's vision was wretchedly curtailed. His salvation lay 
in transcending these ontic concerns--a transcendence into 
"Nothingness". Conscience's call to Resoluteness was really 
the call of Nothingness. In this call freedom inserted 
nothingness between Dasein and Seienden (beings) and allowed 
the Seiendento be seen for the first time for what they 
truely were--thingness. Nothingness accomplished this by 
revealing the boundaries and wholeness of man's situation. 
It is thus (in Nothing) that I come to see that the 
presence of anything and everything before me is a 
united whole, as I also see that it is due to nothing 
other than my own finite horizon-projection. I see 
for the first time clearly, that the Seienden als 
Ganzen could not "be" without my Da-sein, and at the 
same time I realize that the apparent solidity of that 
"world" of things offers no lasting thing upon which I 
can depend as arotection from the dissolution of the 
world in death.1' 
The immediate inclination seems negative, but the overriding 
influence is positive (similar to the role "law" plays in 
the Christian life). Nothing is not a projection of Dasein's  
mind--a mental apprehension of the contrary of being. Nothing 
is Being itself. For this reason only can man experience it. 
Because Being is an issue for Dasein, so is Nothing an issue. 
"The nihilating (das Nichtende) in Being is the essence of 
what I call the Nothing. Because it thinks Being, thought 
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thinks Nothing. 1,14 
In Sein and Zeit the experience of Nothingness was 
closely bound up with the particular mood (Stimmung) Angst. 
Angst prompted the step into Nothing which in turn executed 
the Call of Conscience. Heidegger's later writings tend to 
shy away from this rather "subjective" (Dasein originating)15  
link with Nothing. Man is "thrown" into a necessary rela-
tion with Nothing. Another perspective of Nothing is the 
Heilige. The Holy as an aspect of Being brings into focus 
at least three important Heideggerian concepts: Dasein's  
"wandering in need", transcendence and openness for Being. 
Dasein is more than a being consciously moving towards his 
death. Dasein is a transcendental creature. Recall how 
authentic man pro-jected (to) his limiting horizons. 
Transcendence resembles this pro-ject with this exception--
how Being is the subject. "The preliminary definition of 
'Being as the transcendens as such' expresses simply the 
way in which the essence of Being has so far been cleared 
for man."16 Being clears itself; it creates an openness 
for Being. 
A knotty problem develops in man's relation to Being. 
Where does the impetus begin? Is Dasein dependent on Being? 
If so, in what way is he transcendent? Heidegger gives no 
clear answer; in fact, he does not raise the question. He 
merely portrays man as a wanderer. Again this calls to 
mind Dasein's dual structure: his "throwness", his proneness 
to become lost in the "they" and his ec-static nature. Here 
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a shift in Heidegger is evident. Ex-sistence is no longer 
acceptance of Death--man's limiting horizons; ex-sistence 
portrays man emerging into the transcendent openness for 
Being. 
Man is and is man insofar as he is the existing. He 
stands exposed to the openness of Being, an openness 
which is Being itself, that has projected the essence 
of man into "care". So thrown, man stands "in" the 
openness of Being. "World" is the clearing of Being, 
wherein man stands out from his thrown essence. 
"Being-in-the-World" names the essence of ex-sistence 
in relation to the cleared dimension out of which the 
"ex" of the ex-sistence essentially arises. Thought 
of from the point of view of ex-sistence, "world" is 
in a way transcendence within and for existence.17  
A transcendence within the world signals that Being is some-
how mysteriously18 separated from Dasein--that transcendence 
itself is no direct path to Being. Within the world man 
fluctuates between a concern for practical everyday affairs 
and an attentiveness to Being. As man becomes more and 
more immersed in the present, he experiences an immense 
vacuity which makes him aware of Being's absence. This con-
stant and necessary oscillation between practical matters 
and the mystery of Being Heidegger calls a "wandering in 
need"19 A continual wandering would render Dasein's life 
a worthless one were it not that Being destines otherwise. 
What is openness for Being? The impetus seems to stem from 
Being itself. "Being clears itself for man in ecstatic 
projection. But this projection does not create Being. u20 
Dasein's ex-sistence is Being's destiny.21  Of course, only 
as long as Dasein is, is there Being. That is, only if 
the clearing of Being is realized is Being conveyed to man. 
"That the 'Da' (Here), however, the clearing of Being itself 
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is realized, is the destination of Being itself. This is 
the destiny of the clearing.„ 22  Man possesses one cer-
tainty; he is essentially only in his essence in which he 
is claimed by Being.23 "Only from this claim 'has' he (man) 
found wherein his essence dwells. Only from this dwelling 
'has' he 'language' as the home which preserves the ecstatic 
for his essence."24 
Dasein's ex-sistence, Being's destiny and thus man's 
destiny are all dependent on language. Openness for 
Being is embodied in language; language is the house of 
Being. Within the context of language, Heidegger intro-
duces the important term Denken (Thought). Normally, 
0N Denken belongs to man. Heidegger, however, enlarges this 
common notion. Thought is of Being he claims. As subjective 
genetive this means that thought belongs to Being; as ob-
jective genetive thought listens to or heeds Being.25  
Thought must not be confused with theoretical or practical 
activity and behavior; it supercedes such operations in that 
it precedes them. 
Thought is related to Being as the arriving. Thought 
is as thought in the advent of Being, is bound to Being 
as arrival. Being has already destined itsel
f 
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thought. Being is as the destiny of thought. 6  
Thinking assists the openness or clearing for Being by taking 
Being's unspoken word and shaping it into language. "Thus 
language is at once the house of being and the dwelling of 
human beings."27 Again Heidegger warns against mistaking 
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language with the usual unity of sound-form, melody, 
rhythym and meaning. "The point is to think of the essence 
of- language in its correspondence to Being, and what is 
more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling of 
man's essence."28 Correspondence (entsprechen) implies 
a speaking (sprechen); language as originative thinking 
penetrates the silent,, wordless uncanniness of Being, 
listens to this mute utterance and corresponds by incar-
nating this experience in language.29 The Greek language 
is the classic example, for 
in the Greek language what is said in it is at the same 
time in an excellent way what it is called. If we 
hear a Greek word with a Greek ear we follow its 
lecrein (its speaking), its direct presentation. What 
it presents is what lies immediately before us. Through 
the audible Greek word we are directly in the presence 
of the thing itself, not first in the presence of a 
mere word sign. 
Furthermore, language is essential as conversation. That 
the gods have led us into conversation is the basis of the 
proposition that language is the supreme event of human 
existence. Yes, we have been a single conversation since 
the time when it "is time".31 
One caution is to be noted. Being's uncanniness never 
permits exact translation into language. "Language is (both) 
the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself."32 Being's 
transparencyinlanguage is limited by the complex way in 
which language unfolds in the historical (Geschichtliche)33  
and is consummated in poetry. Language guarantees that man 
can exist historically in that previous thinkers have moulded 
their thinking in language. "To express over and over again 
the advent of Being, permanent and in its permanence waiting 
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for man, is the only matter for thought. That is why the 
essential thinkers always say the same thing."34 Langan 
outlines the procedure in this manner. 
Essential thinking, on the other hand, pulls the 
Seienden from the darkness of night into the light of 
Being. Heidegger, as we -have seen, emphasizes the 
originativeness in this, the act of interpretation. 
Far from being a passive process of objective impres- 
sion, interpretation demands that Dasein radiate the 
light of new intelligence from his own resources, 
i.e., from out of the Nothing, to illumine the Wesen, 
capturing the new meaning that it discovers there in 
that house of language which Dasein has built to pro- 
tect Being's revelation in time. Dasein gathers up 
from the past the light that other generations have 
brought to bear on the Seienden and thus, extending 
the range of previous insights, prolongs the tradition 
toward the future, which it thus builds-Qut existentially. 
So it is that das Sein kommt nach Hause.35  
History is a limiting factor in another way. As seen above, 
Being is the destiny of thought. Destiny limits by holding 
back. "The innermost essence of home is already the destiny 
of. Providence, or as we now call it: History. Nevertheless, 
in the dispensation of Providence, the essence is not yet 
completely handed over. It is still being held back."36 His-
tory restricts what is to be said about Being and how this 
is to be said by constantly considering "whether that which 
has-to-be-thought may be said, to what extent, at what moment 
in the history of Being, in what dialogue with it, and with 
what claim. "37  
Poetry is the sphere in which originative thought, 
language and history coalesce. Its relation to history is 
expressed as follows. "Being as the destiny that destines 
truth remains concealed. But the world's destiny is proclaimed 
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in poetry without its becoming apparent at once as the his- 
tory of Being."38 Thinking and language are wed together 
with poetry in one of Heidegger's more familiar phrases, 
"The thinker pronounces Being; the poet names the Holy".39  
The poet names the Holy; he establishes the permanent by the 
word and in the word;" in this naming the poet comes into 
the proximity of the Homeland (openness for Being); 41  he 
is cast out into the Between--between the gods and the 
people.42 Original thinking--fundamental poetizing--makes 
language possible. In naming the Holy the poet "grasps" the 
High One himself, i.e., causes the High One to appear in 
words.43 In naming the Holy the poet also brings the Word 
to where past, present and future meet and thus transcends 
this man or this time. But the naming of the Holy does not 
reside completely with the poet. "The poetic word only 
acquires its power of naming when the gods themselves bring 
us to language. How do the gods speak? '....And signs to 
us from antiquity are the language of the gods.44 The speech 
of the poet is the intercepting of these signs, in order to 
pass them on to his own people."45 Therefore the poet needs 
careful writers and thinkers whose own remembrance will help 
retain the elusive words of poetry in all their truth. For 
poetry is to result in a process of understanding that will 
enable each hearer to have a Homecoming in the manner appro-
priate for him.46  
Once this point has been reached, it takes little effort 
to recall the Existentiales of Sein and Zeit, couple them 
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with the prominent place of language and the suggestive 
function of poetry and see in these expressions a very 
definite similarity to religious vocabulary. As usual, 
Heidegger's explicit pronouncements on this relationship 
are not precise. Heidegger has repeatedly maintained a 
neutrality in regard to value or religious judgments. His 
is to be solely a phenomenological description. "There-
fore, with the existential determination of the essence of 
man nothing has yet been decided about the 'existence' 
or 'non-existence' of God, not about the possibility or 
impossibility of God."47 In his The Fundamental Question  
of Metaphysics Heidegger depicts "Christian philosophy" 
as a round square and a misunderstanding. "Only epochs 
which no longer fully believe in the true greatness of 
the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that 
philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if 
not a substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs 
and tastes of the time. For the original Christian faith 
philosophy is foolishness."48 But the outcome is not quite 
so clear cut. A vague dependence of theology on philosophy 
emerges in the designation of the "Holy" as an aspect of 
Nothingness. Remembrance of the Poet introduces a seemingly 
synonymous symbol for the "Holy"--the "Gevierte". In this 
"place?". (situation?, encounter?) earth, heaven, divinities 
and mortals fuse into an unity which demands that we men 
"save", "receive", and "wait on" Being.49 Or the relation 
is stated in these terms. Being is not god, yet is closer 
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to man than any other being, be it a rock, an animal, a 
machine, an angel or God.5° The divine, however, is 
nearer to us than the strangeness of animals. And the 
divine (God) can only be encountered when one is in a right 
relation to Being. 
Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the 
holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy can 
the essence of divinity be thought. Only in the 
light of the essence of divinity can it be thought and 
said what the word 'God" is to signify. Or must we 
not first be able to understand and hear these words 
carefully if we as men, i.e., as existing beings, are 
to have the privilege of experiencing a relation of 
God to man? How, then, is the man of the present 
epoch even to be able to ask seriously and firmly 
whether God approaches or withdraws when man omits the 
primary step of thinking deeply in the one dimension 
where this question can be asked: that is, the dimen-
sion of the holy, which, even as dimension, remains 
closed unless the openneeof Being is cleared and in 
its clearing is close to man. Perhaps the distinction 
of this age consists in the fact that the dimension 
of grace hgq been closed. Perhaps this is its unique 
dis-grace.'i  
One final topic demands closer attention before we dis-
cuss the theological implications Heinrich Ott reads into 
Heidegger. Again the aforementioned question must be asked. 
What is the origin of the impetus that instigates the language-
event? What part does Being play? How much activity can 
be ascribed to man? The evidence is vague. In the first 
place, Dasein finds himself thrown (Geworfen) into the world 
in such a way that he naturally succumbs to the sterile 
thinking patterns of the "they" (Verfallen), at least to some 
degree. Fallen Dasein wanders about in need. But Dasein ex-
sists, he stands out from his position; he stands out in the 
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openness of Being. Man himself does not do the pro-
jecting, though. "What projects in the project is not 
man, but Being himself, which destines man to the ex-
sistence which is the essence of Dasein. This destiny is 
realized as the clearing of Being."52 It is within this 
clearing, this nearness (Homeland) that "the decision, if 
any, is reached as to whether and how God and the gods deny 
themselves and the night remains, whether and how the day 
of the Holy dawns, whether and how in the rise of the Holy 
an appearance of God and the gods can start anew ". Man's 
activities seem limited to two responsibilities. He must 
somehow undergo a long, patient preparation of waiting or 
letting happen. And if the destiny of Being projects the 
advent of itself to man by addressing and claiming him 
through language, man corresponds by housing this encounter 
in language. Dasein is the Shepherd of Being. 
Ours is a task of preparation and anticipation for an 
essential h8ren of what the true poet names and the 
originative thinker says. We are to hear and to preserve. 
It is not given to everyone to name the holy, but it is 
the duty of everyone in the absence of the God (i.e., in 
the epoch of de-ontologization, of Seinvergessenheit), to 
listen as the poet names that NAhe (proximity) which re-
mains ever fern (distant), the Being to which we our-
selves are the way of access, but which we never fully 
discover.54 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HERMENEUTIC OF HEINRICH OTT 
Despite the claim of neutrality, the "later" Heidegger 
has bequeathed to theology a thought structure and phrase-
ology ripe with possibilities. If through Bultmann 
Heidegger's demand for authentic self acceptance has in-
fluenced Biblical exegesis, does not his stress on and use 
of language offer an even more appropriate direction for 
theological hermeneutics? Chapter two briefly sketched a 
possible line of development. But now we would like to 
take the theologian who has most exclusively dealt with 
Heidegger--a systematician who views the nature of theology 
as a whole as hermeneutical'1  --Heinrich Ott. Ott claims 
that Heidegger is not as neutral as he seems, that Heidegger 
does see in theology a capacity for genuine thinking dis-
tinct from science's inability to think. 
I am quite aware that in his works Heidegger's posi- 
tion on Christian faith and theology is not unambiguous. 
Yet, in spite of the obscurities on this point that 
emerge when one surveys the complete work of Heidegger, 
I maintain that one can document unambiguously from 
Heidegger's writings the distinct thread of connection 
I seek to establish, the correspondence between 
Heidegger's thinking and the self-understanding of 
dogmatics. It cannot be denied that the aspect of 
importance to me has its basic lines set out in Heidegger's 
own work.2  
This statement raises two important questions which the 
following chapter will attempt to answer: What is the rela-
tion of philosophy and theology? How has this relation 
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influenced Ott's hermeneutic? Neither can be answered with 
precise clarity. In the first place, Ott views the task of 
theology as necessarily flexible. He condemns as futile an 
obsession with particulars at the expense of the larger 
context. Or in line with Barth's plea, Ott resists Barthian 
scholasticism and instead discovers God's message as true 
though not final, as a message in need of genuine retracta-
tion, as a message that forms the presupposition of what 
has now to be thought out.3 In the second place, Ott's 
recent arrival as a major thinker in theological circles, 
his youth and as yet the small handful of publications4  
reveal the continuing heavy influence of his teachers (Barth 
and Bultmann). Ott's thinking has yet to come into its 
own. 
The Introduction to Ott's latest book, Theology and 
Preaching (1961), offers guidelines for answering our two 
questions. Paying his indebtedness to Bultmann for the 
insight, Ott here distinguishes between ontology and her-
meneutics. 
Rightly understood, hermeneutics and ontology are 
bound up with each other in the closest possible way. 
Hermeneutically we inquire into the specific modus  
loquendi, the mode of speaking (and therewith into the 
"whence") of the individual Biblical testimonies; 
ontologically we inquire into the specific modus essendi, 
the mode of being, of the reality to which they testi-
fy. We shall not succeed in achieving the break-through 
to the real man, unanimously postulated by Barth, 
Bonhoeffer and Bultmann, if we neglect these two, 
closely inter-connected questions.6  
The modus loquendi obviously involves the question of her-
meneutics. The ontological, inquiring as it does into the 
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mode of being, undertakes a relation to philosophy. For 
in order to break through to his "real" being, man must 
properly grasp his limiting horizons, where he stands in 
relation to them,how they affect him and vice versa. Ott 
points toward the theological-philosophical interaction in 
these words. 
So ist die Begegnung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie 
aus zwei GrUnden unvermeidlich: 1. weil die Theologie 
selber zum moglichen philosophischen Denkinhalt geworden 
ist; 2. weil die Theologie im Verfolgen ihrer eigenen 
spezifischen Grundlagenforschung genotigt ist, sich 
auf das Feld philosophischer Fragestellungen zu begeben.7  
Let it be noted that Ott does not indiscriminately merge 
the two. At several points the tasks are similar, but "der 
Unterschied zwischen dem philosophischen und dem theologischen 
Denken und Reden liegt, so sagten wir, darin, das das 
letztere sich auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes beruft".8  
Ontology assists man (being) in penetrating his horizons 
(Sein) where experiencing his limits (Nothingness) he comes 
face to face with the only important Seinsfrage, "Why are 
there beings at all and not nothing?" Encounter with the 
uncanny silence of this Nothing establishes man as "thinking-
man" (Denken), enables him to transcend the "they's" en-
grossing concern with beings and sustains his continued interest 
in the Seinsfrage. In other words, the way proceeds from 
being (Seienden-man and/or Bible texts) through Nothing (the 
Unthought) to Being (Revelation) and back to being again 
(Correspondence).9 Sounds Heideggerian, you say? Perhaps, 
but it is also Ott's way of theology. Though Nothingness 
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has a heavy negative ring which some have interpreted as 
the eliminationS111 God talk,10 Ott reads a more positive 
note into this experience. "In dieser Erfahrung (des 
Nichts) kommt er (Mensch) faktisch vor Gott und die 
creatio e nihilo. Die Erfahrung des Nichts und in ihr die 
Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden ist ein Moment der Gottes-
begegnung des die Welt denkenden, des philosophierenden  
Menschen."11  But Ott wants to impart an even fuller content 
to the experience of Nothingness, which we remember from 
Heidegger is the Unthought aspect of Sein. "Hat nicht 
die Theologie ihr Ungedachtes in der Erfahrung des Glaubens, 
aus der sie herkommt und in die sie zurtickfthrt?"12 And to 
continue: 
Das Sein Gottes bedeutet, so wie °sein" bis jetzt 
verstanden haben,13 ein Geschehen der Entbergung: 
dass Gott sich dem Denken entbirgt als der, der Er ist; 
das Er selber als ein Geschick das Denken trifft und 
sich ihm als zu-denkende Sache aufgibt, dass Er dem 
Denken als Anspruch begegnet und vom denkenden Men-
schen ein Entsprechen in Freiheit fordert. Das vom 
Sein Gottes "getroffene" Denken is aber das Denken 
des Glaubens.14  
Theology's attestation to man's mode of being begins when 
the faith-thinker is placed in the Unthought (the experience 
of faith itself) where he receives the gift of Revelation. 
The "conditions of the possibility of thinking" which 
Heidegger correlated with Sein  and Nothingness, are for 
theology somehow bound up both with Revelation and with 
Faith. Via the Unthought, a thinking faith breaks through to 
Revelation (its limits) and back again to show man what he 
"really" is. And this thinking quite clearly crosses 
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philosophic lines--the philosophy of Heidegger, that is. 
Just piercing into the Unthought of Revelation and 
listening to its muteness is not sufficient. Revelation 
demands of thinking man a cor-respondence in freedom. 
Correspondence takes place at the human level, is embodied 
in language and thus brings into play the modus loquendi.15  
Ott has supplied another outline into which the material 
in this section can be channeled. His article "What Is Systematic 
Theology?" splits the motion of theology into a threefold 
division: exegesis, dogmatics and proclamation. Though 
the framework remains somewhat unwieldly, it allows 
us to see the basic movement of Ott's hermeneutics. Exegesis 
receives for Ott a philosophical flavor in two ways. First 
Ott appeals to Heidegger's phenomenological method summarized 
in Husserl's phrase "to the things themselves". Allowing 
things to show themselves for what they are tends to eliminate 
predetermined conclusions that often distort men's vision. 
Theology too, says Ott quoting Barth, must defend itself 
against the unhealthy pressures of alien influences. 
Theology too must heed the injunction of phenomenology and 
return to its own theological, not philosophical, foundations. 
Reformation theology has such a ready made principle at 
hand--"Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres".16  Are 
scriptures, then, the "thing itself" to which exegesis 
must return? Will scriptures "let happen" or "show" or 
"unbare" whatever theology has to offer? Yes and No. Yes, 
in that exegesis must always begin with the concrete text. 
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Previous hearers of revelation have (cor)-responded in 
language with just these words, though we do well to 
remember the historic conditioned presuppositions under 
which they labored. No, in that by themselves scriptures 
never offer a complete showing. They channel us to the 
place where revelation can be encountered. Scriptures are 
the phenomenal point of departure, but they are only part 
of a larger complex--the Word of God. They project us 
into a sphere in which revelation can be heard and integrated 
with our being in a way that takes on "real" meaning. This 
two-directional movement stamps on exegesis its second link 
with philosophy. 
Zum Spezifischen der Theologie, namlich zu ihrer 
Berufung auf die Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes, gehort 
allerdings ihr gehorsames }Oren auf konkrete Texts. 
Wenn sie daneben den philosophischen Wesenblick mit 
intergriert, so ist dies nichts Zusatzliches und 
Zufalliges,sondern es gehort mit zu ihrem Wesen. Denn 
in der Offenbarung des Wortes Gottes begegnet ihr ein 
Anspruch, welcher, aufs Ganze geht. Wenn sie diesen 
Ganzheitanspruch ernst nehmen will, darf sie sick 
nicht in partikularen Raumen bewegen, sondern muss die 
Gesamtheit der jeweils zuganglichen Phanomene des 
Wirklichen mitbedenken, und zwar nicht gewaltsam, 
sondern so, wie die Phanomene selbst es erfordern, 
und d.h. eben: philosophisch.17  
In so doing exegesis has broadened its scope to include 
dogmatics. 
Dogmatics moves out beyond the individual text, unifies 
it with the total compass of theology and presents it to 
the preacher. "Hermeneutical arch" is one of Ott's symbolic 
descriptions of this process. The other retains the more 
traditional picture of the hermeneutical circle. At this 
level the differences between ontological and hermeneutical 
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functions are obliterated and the two merge into what 
Michalson calls an ontological hermeneutic. 18 At the 
basis of this merger is Ott's absorbing concern with 
understanding and thinking. Faith must be unfolded in 
thinking; fides quaerens intellectum. Thinking or under-
standing must operate within a circle--a methodological 
or hermeneutical principle which Ott, adapting from 
Heidegger, defines in this way. "Wir verstehen darunter ein 
Vorgehen, bei dem eine Grosse durch eine andere und diese 
wiederum durch jene erldutere wider, A durch B und B 
durch A bzw. zwei Aspekte ein und derselben Sache einander 
wechselseitig erhellen."19 At one level this circle sends 
dogmatics back to the exegesis of particular passages. At 
another level it moves out to thinking to probe the condi-
tions of the possibilities of understanding. The conditions 
underlying a faith impregnated understanding were the 
horizons of the Unthought in which Revelation speaks. To 
this sphere, are the believers led by dogmatics through the 
channel of concrete texts. 
Wir haben nicht Paulus, Johannes und die Synoptiker, 
Jessaja und die Psalmen usw. "auslegen", indem wir 
genau "herattlffinden", was sie mit jedem einzelnen Satz 
"gemeint" haben. (Dass man das bis zu einem gewissen 
Grade Kann und auch sol, sei nich bestritten!). Sondern 
wir haben vor alien mit ihnen ins Gesprgch zu kommen, 
uns von ihnen ins Gegendber zur gemeinsamen "Sache" 
der Offenbarung bringen zu lassen, damit auch wir auf 
Gottes Wort eine Antwort erteilen konnen (denn nur 
antwortend sind wir Oberhaupt in der Lage, wirklich 
zu horen:1--und dies alles darum, weil wir mit ihnen 
allen zusammen zur einen communio sanctorum gehoren. 
Aus diesem ursprtinglicheren Ansatz, dieser neuen 
Dimension der Hermeneutik, ldsst sich dann dartiber 
:verhandeln, welches Recht und wievielWahrheit den 
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Ergebnissen der historisch-kritischen Exegese im 
Einzelnen zukommen mag. 20 
Hermeneutics is no longer confined to the task of the modus  
loquendi. It now operates with a more original form of 
language than a pericope.21 On the one hand it must clarify 
as far as possible the mystic like language (poetry) that 
lets a hearing of revelation take place. On the other hand 
it must offer guidelines for man's response of incorporating 
the hearing into human speech--a conversation among the 
communion of saints. 
Language's original movement with which hermeneutics is 
concerned and which is the foundation of all other types of 
communication--written words, speech, etc.--is best described 
by Ott in his latest article, "Das Problem des nicht-
objektivierenden Denkens and Redens". Ott affirms the non-
objective22 character of theological language by comparing 
it to three similar types of expression: poetry, political 
speech and philosophical language. Each has its unique task 
differing from the informational function of objective lan- 
guage. For example, poetry is an event in the hearing of 
which man is brought to a determined place, into the almighty, 
shattering silence of the Geheimnis. Words do not refer 
to specific objects; they do, but only in so far as they 
are the vehicles which bring the hearer to the Geheimnis.23  
In fact, words first speak to us.24 Political speech like-
wise guides man to a place--a place of responsibility. And 
the philosopher's words, instead of informing or pointing 
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to particulars, direct man to an essential Wesenblick. 
Ott combines these traits as he sketches the operation of 
theological language. Theological thinking and speaking 
are also events bringing men to a place--the place of 
revelation or the Geheimnis Gottes. The place is further 
described as a place of freedom where man can obediently 
hear and witness (bezeugen) to the Word of God. Hearing is 
an event (Tun) evoking an "inner"/"outer" hearing called 
faith. Because man occupies a place in this shattering 
silence of God's Geheimnis, because he is set free to hear 
and witness and because as man he also occupies the house 
of language,25 not only must he do dogmatics, he must also 
respond to God's revelation in proclamation. Ott would say, 
"dass in der kerygmatischen Rede ein Mehsch jetzt und hier 
vor bestimmten andern Menschen das Wort Gottes verantwortet, 
indem er es ihnen zu-spricht, w4hrend die theologische Rede 
den Menschen und den Ort bringt, wo er die parrhesia zu 
solchem Verantworten gewinnt".26 
Proclamation (preaching) and exegesis form opposite ends 
of Ott's hermeneutical arch. The exegete approaches the 
text as the "thing itself", lets the text manifest its own 
content. Next, the exegete hands his discoveries over to 
the dogmatician; the dogmatician unifies this particular 
pericope within the whole context of theology and hands it 
back to the preacher. The process is much too crudely 
depicted, but it is sufficient for noting the curious change 
in Ott's thinking. Ott has said little about proclamation. 
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Throughout his works numerous references and illusions occur27  
but nothing of an extended nature. Even in his book Theology  
and Preaching, preaching is always discussed in conjunction 
with theology. Ott is not trying to belittle proclamation. 
It is the necessary correspondence to God's revelation. 
Proclamation is bound up with the communion of saints. 
In fact, dialogue among fellow men is more than a mere 
phenomenon; it is a basic structure of all existence-28  
Proclamation does possess some peculiarities which set it 
apart from other areas of theology. Whereas dogmatics 
encompasses the whole of theology in a unified and formal 
way, proclamation, catering to particular situation, is one- 
sided; stress is placed on the one aspect which fits the 
need. Yes, preaching is announced in a more personal and 
direct way, i.e., in alkerygmatic-existential way".29 It is 
only in the Postscript to his Theology and Preaching that 
Ott tells us what proclamation is; proclamation is "disclosure". 
Here lies the curious twist. To avoid being labeled a disciple 
of natural theology, Ott defines disclosure as a methodolog-
ical concept "inspired by phenomenology and its maxim: 'Let 
us observe things themselves"; But no longer are "the 
things themselves" concrete Bible texts. The phenomena are 
now those disclosures of revelation and of the Unthought 
encountered by the believer in the complex situation 
described above. Disclosure says even more about proclamation. 
For what disclosure is not is demonstration--truth assertions 
claiming demonstrable accuracy.31 In other words, proclama- 
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tion assumes the form of non-objective speech, a form of 
language similar to poetry. 
CHAPTER V 
AN ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTIC 
The summaries and conclusions of the past two chapters 
will now be presented. Martin Heidegger has been the pre-
dominent and guiding influence in the development of the 
"new hermeneutic". His Sein und Zeit hermeneutic--a re-
turn to Dasein along the lines of Husserl's phenomenology--
sought to clarify the structures (Existentiales) of man's 
being. This analysis revealed that man is thrown (Geworfen) 
into his situation (Being-in-the-world). An additional hu-
man polarity is also revealed. Man is fallen--swallowed up 
in the "they" he concentrates his thinking on present trivi-
alities; man is ex-sistent--he stands out futurally to accept 
his limiting factor, death. Acceptance of death and orient-
ing onds life accordingly, says Heidegger, is authentic 
living. But Sein und Zeit claimed to be only a provisional 
experiment leading to the final task of analysing Being 
itself. Heidegger's later writings have leaned in this 
direction, and consequently his hermeneutic has sought to 
1 
fulfill the second and extended task he assigned to it. 
Ex-sistent is no longer referred to as standing out toward 
ones death. Man now ex-sists because he stands out in the 
light of Being. That which is in need of clarification is 
no longer Dasein but Being, and the corresponding hermeneutic 
is no longer ontic but ontological.2 The change is evidenced 
by the prominent place given to language and within language 
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the position which poetry is accorded. Poetry soars above 
mundane existence and forms a mediating link between Dasein  
and Sein. A further indication of this ontological turn 
is signalled in Sein's domineering control as to where, when 
and how it communicates itself to man. This ontological 
shift, naturally conducive to theology, has stimulated and 
moulded the present thought of Heinrich Ott and become the 
characteristic mark of the "new hermeneutic". In what folaows, 
this claim will be substantiated by marshalling the evi-
dence presented in the past chapters and by taking into 
account some recent reactions to the Ott-Heidegger combina-
tion. 
1 Ott has assigned to philosophy, and especially 
that of Martin Heidegger, a definite role in theology. 
First, this is evidenced by the heavy value Ott places 
upon thinking (Denken). Ott's primary presupposition is 
that fides quaerens intellectum. Theology's task necessarily 
involves rational processes and formulations. Granted 
this, Ott attaches himself to Heidegger, for in Ott's esti-
mation Heidegger is the "thinker of thinkers".3 Heidegger 
also questions metaphysics, its feasibility as a method for 
the quest of Being, an insight that makes him revelant for 
theology.4 Ott too has openly championed the overcoming of 
metaphysics in theology and gladly displays a portion of a 
letter sent to him by Heidegger upon the publication of 
Ott's Denken and Sein. Says Heidegger, "As long as 
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anthropological-cosmological conceptualizing of existentialism 
are not overcome and pushed to the side, theology will never 
enter into the freedom of saying what is entrusted to it".5  
Second, Ott's relation to philosophy and Heidegger is openly 
proclaimed by him (Ott) on several occasions. Denken und Sein 
quotes several passages from Heidegger's Letter On Humanism  
and IdentitAt und Differenz in which the author notes possi- 
ble openings for a theological venture.6 What Is SystematicTheology:; 
formulates this thesis: "With this, we return to Heidegger. 
I claim--and this is my tenth thesis--that the understanding 
of systematic theology developed here corresponds to the 
understanding of thinking and of language offered by Heidegger".7  
In presenting the linguistic structures of poetry as prepara- 
tion for developing the non-objective nature of theological 
language, Ott supports his presentation with a Heideggerian 
image.8 Finally, while contending against Bultmann and Fuchs 
and their understanding of the task of theology, Ott once 
more shores up his views by appealing to Heidegger.9  
Ott's affinity with philosophy and Heidegger has not 
gone by unchallenged. From within the framework of theology, 
Ott's basic assumption--fides quaerens intellectum--must be 
granted. Theology as the logos about divine things is by 
definition rational and logical. Since faith comprises 
the relationship between God and man, and since the human 
side of this polarity should, to experience a more meaning- 
ful relationship, be informed by a knowledge of what the 
world and man are, philosophy is asked to provide such infor- 
mation.10 Nevertheless, Jonas claims that since Heidegger 
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has borrowed so much from theology,11 while others have 
argued that Ott has done the same with philosophy, both 
philosophy and theology should examine the validity of these 
procedures. Approaching this same fault from another angle, 
Michalson and Jdngel have criticized the one-sidedness of 
Ott's relation. Heidegger's philosophy is valuable for its 
critical function in the service of contempory theology. 
By itself it is not a theological expression. Therefore 
Ott's dialogue with Heidegger remains onesided.12 Or the 
partiality is seen to reside in Ott's bias for Heidegger 
alone of all the philosophers. Theology is interested 
in understanding human thought, not just the thinking of 
one man.13 An additional censure is leveled by JUngel at 
Ott for accepting a Heideggerian transcendental which is 
not Heideggerian. That is, recognizing Sein as the transcen-
dental presupposition of thinking, Ott still remains within 
metaphysics, for thinking makes suppositions and these are 
metaphysical.18 After all this, Jonas proposes some guide-
lines for a worthwhile theology/philosophy dialogue. The 
philosophy most adequate for theology would be the one that 
best deals with being. Since theology can never wait for a 
philosophical consensus on this matter, the theologian may 
be guided in his choice by: the appeal of infinity, the 
lessons past liaisons with philosophy have taught, present 
needs, choosing the philosophy most helpful in discharging 
theology's task and the one least dangerous, least seductive, 
least alienating.15 
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2 Ott has espoused an ontological hermeneutic. 
The most obvious proof of Ott's ontological outlook 
is his almost wholesale adoption of Heidegger--the philosopher 
who acknowledges the primacy of Being. Yet Ott's own writings 
offer us more precise corroboration. First and most telling 
is Ott's shift in viewing phenomenology. "The things them-
selves" in a more ontic, historic approach would have been 
concrete Bible texts and pericopes. At first for Ott they 
were. But Bible passages were merely provisional, preparatory 
steps designed to place us in the openness of revelation.16  
"The things themselves" thus become revelation's utterances. 
Coming from the unthought secrecy of the Holy (Nothingness/ 
Sein), such phenomena are ontological and a hermeneutic 
designed to cope with them is similarly ontological. Ott's 
close conjunction between theology and preaching occasions 
the second piece of evidence. Preaching begins with texts 
and ends with people. If anything is ontic, it is preaching. 
After completing a book on preaching, all Ott can say is 
that preaching is "disclosure"--disclosure of the human situa-
tion. Does not this sound like the early Heidegger 
concerned with clarifying Dasein's Existentiales? It does 
with one major exception. Heidegger's insights remained 
human; Dasein manifested its own structures. Ott's 
"disclosure" comes not from men. 
That such disclosure succeeds....is something that lies 
under the will of God. It succeeds when He allows 
His light to shine upon us. But we begin to think 
under the presupposition that we have already seen the 
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light of God in His word, and that it will perhaps 
please Him to allow us by grace to see it more and 
more and ever afresh. Dominus illuminatio mea--et 
illuminatio mundi. The Lord is my light--and the 
light of the world! But it is just under this pre-
supposition that our thinking is carried out. For 
this reason the methodological principle of "disclosure" 
belongs necesarily to the quest of fides quaerens  
intellectum.i7  
Ott's "disclosure" is ontological. A third sign of Ott's 
ontological propensity is the elevated position and non-
objective form of language in his thinking. Language's 
action is twofold: the revealing action of the Holy and 
man's corresponding answer communicated among other men. 
Necessarily prior is the former--the house of Being in which 
the "inner"/"outer" continuum can be experienced.18 Like 
poetry such language is an event; it brings us to a place--
the light of Being. Man hears and answers. In answering 
he must incorporate language (Sprache) into speech so that 
he can carry on a conversation (Gesprach) with fellow men 
(communion of saints). Once again the prominent concern is 
with the movement of the Holy to man, with the originative 
language event which gives rise to human communication--both 
ontological concerns. And this I submit is the distinguish-
ing mark of the Robinson defined "new hermeneutic". Besides 
those ideas of Fuchs and Ebeling mentioned in chapter two19  
I quote from the final pages of Robinson's introductory chapter. 
This emphasis upon analyzing the possibility of inter-
pretation as it in fact takes place, and thus upon the 
analysis of what is, is designated by Gadamer as an 
"ontological turn in hermeneutic". "This ontological 
turn in hermeneutic signifies its elimination as a 
doctrine of a special art or method. It makes the 
theory'of understanding into a central philosophical 
problematic."...Word is "selfless", and what the 
Biblical author is talking about transcends his self-
understanding. What language has to say must be sought 
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in terms of its subject matter, so that the word 
"disappears" into what it has to say. To be sure, 
what the word has to say does not lie outside language 
as understood by the new hermeneutic --a point made 
by Heidegger and conceded by Gadamer. Yet it is this 
dialectic between language and its subject matter 
(Sprache and Sache) rather than that between mythologi-
cal language and the existential self-understanding it 
objectifies, which designates the point at whic4,
"
the 
hermeneutical discussion in Germany now stands.  
Opposition to Ott's degree of non-objectifying language 
has likewise appeared. The most penetrating remarks are 
those of Hans Jonas. Non-objectifying language does occur 
in the Psalmists, prophets and prayers, he agrees. But 
the theologian's task, bound up with theoretical discourse, 
is likewise bound up with objective language. Its task is 
to recognize the inadequate language but to keep this neces-
sary inadequacy transparent for what is to be indicated by 
it. For myth taken literally is crudest objectification; 
and myth taken allegorically is sophisticated objectifica-
tion; but myth taken symbolically is the glass through which 
we see darkly.21 
Therefore, taking all these considerations into account, 
with Carl Michalson I also claim that for Ott two things 
remain: "(1) an interpretation in which being and not 
human existence is the horizon for hermeneutical interroga-
tion; and (2) a deduction of the relevant questions to which 
being will reveal its secrets in the exegetical moment...Ott 
now proposes to develop theological hermeneutic as an 
ontological enterprize" .22  Ott's project is largely a result 
of his dependency on and agreement with Martin Heidegger. 
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Mention should be made of several remaining problems 
that, though lying outside the scope of this paper, are 
relevant for further discussions. First are the criticisms 
of Jonas, JUngel and Michalson mentioned above. Second is 
the supression of the historical objected to by Michalson in 
his article "Theology As Ontology And As History". Third is 
the relation, reaction and influence Ott has to his great 
teachers Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. Finally one must 
come face to face with the provocative interpretation with 
which Langan concludes his work on Heidegger. Heidegger's 
final analysis cannot comport with a Christian outlook. For 
the Christian the end (telos) is a transcendental Other 
outside human temporality. For Heidegger authenticity is 
Dasein accepting his finitude in which Being unfolds itself 
(though never completely).23 Because of his failure to 
deal adequately with the Other, Heidegger's 
"mystery" turns out to hide no incomprehensibly rich 
other, but only our own limits; the Heilige turns out 
to hold no real gift, but is rather an expression of 
our finite "not yet"; the "grace of Being" turns out 
to be no real gift, for it is drawn inexplicably from 
our own resources. Aletheia itself finally fails to 
be an end and motive force,,to become an historical 
sign of our incompleteness. 
Heidegger's apparent rapport with theology might not be so 
beneficial after all. 
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